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Abstract
This study uses quantitative methods to explore how the memory of Katyn is mobilised in political discourse.
The scholarly literature on memory conflict tends to see international memory disputes as an expression of a
state’s interests as a whole; this study analyses when hostile rhetoric is mobilised and finds that in Poland
Katyn is invoked as part of an opposition strategy that criticises the incumbent regime for undermining the
national interest. Periods of accelerated debate about the significance of Katyn have occurred as political
elites sought to achieve specific domestic rather than foreign political goals.
ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2009, EUROPE’S POLITICAL LEADERS GATHERED at Westerplatte, a
peninsula in Gdan´sk, and to Poles a symbol of their heroic resistance to Nazi aggression.
The occasion—the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of WWII—saw Polish President Lech
Kaczyn´ski and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin clash over the memory of WWII.
It appeared that Polish and Russian memories of the war were fundamentally incompatible:
Kaczyn´ski recalled the brave Polish soldiers who fought against the Germans until
17 September and ‘the stab in the back from Bolshevik Russia’, while Putin likened the
execution of Polish nationals at Katyn to the death of Soviet soldiers in Polish prison camps
during the 1919–1920 Polish–Russian war (Sandecki 2009). Kaczyn´ski further claimed
that the Red Army’s ‘treacherous attack’ brought ‘the night of occupation, the essence of
which was the Holocaust, Auschwitz, Katyn. One might ask, what connects Katyn with the
Holocaust? The Jews were killed because they were Jews, the Polish officers because they
were Poles. Such is the comparison’ (Sandecki 2009). In his speech, Kaczyn´ski presented a
narrative whereby Poland was attacked by the equal and opposite hostile forces of Russia
(rather than the USSR) and Germany that harmed Poland in equal measure.1 Such an
interpretation was fundamentally incompatible with the Russian view where the Red Army
had liberated Europe from fascism and Katyn was merely one of many Stalinist excesses.
The episode at Westerplatte illustrates how debates about history in post-communist
Poland and Russia have invaded space normally reserved for foreign policy. Both heads of
1This narrative is generally accepted in Poland. The Gazeta Wyborcza, normally critical of Lech
Kaczyn´ski, espouses the same interpretation; see for instance Radziwinowicz (2009).
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state debated the history of WWII and Katyn in order to defend the ‘national interest’ in
historical questions, because a particular historical narrative was fundamental to their
conception of national identity. Most studies of identity assume a degree of stability in
identity discourse. This article challenges this assumption by tracing the way Katyn was
invoked in order to achieve domestic and foreign political goals. The conflict between
the nations’ representatives at Westerplatte in 2009 was highly visible and contributed
substantially to re-igniting international interest in Katyn,2 but a closer investigation of
the topic will show that the aggressive promotion of provocative historical narratives was
associated most strongly with the domestic opposition. This article is one of the first to
utilise quantitative methods to map the presence and absence of memory-events in political
discourse.3
The scholarly literature on memory conflict tends to see international memory disputes as
an expression of a state’s interests as a whole. This study analyses the circumstances in
which hostile rhetoric is mobilised and finds that in Poland the Law and Justice party
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´—PiS) mobilised Katyn as part of an opposition strategy where the
ruling party Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska—PO) was criticised for undermining
the national interest. This article situates the interest of PiS in Katyn in the context of its
anti-communist platform, which sought to challenge the Polish post-socialist order. PiS used
anti-communist arguments to justify hostility towards Russia more intensively in the run-up
to elections and less so immediately following elections. The article concludes that
high-level memory squabbles are the product of post-communist elites seeking ideological
differentiation in a ‘flat’ party landscape and only ostensibly about foreign policy.
The article has five main sections: first, the intellectual framework and relevant literature are
outlined, then the quantitative methods and coding of variables are presented, before
examining first the general dynamics of the Katyn discourse in Gazeta Wyborcza and
Rzeczpospolita, the distribution of texts specifically critical of Russia, and finally
highlighting the distribution of explicit othering arguments.
The Soviet secret police, the NKVD (Narodnyi Kommisariat Vnutrennikh Del), carried out
the execution of 21,768 Polish citizens known as the Katyn massacre in April–May 1940.
Following the Red Army’s entry into eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, 14,600 Polish
prisoners of war were taken from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszkow, killed in
the Katyn forest outside Smolensk and NKVD prison cells in Kharkov and Kalinin
(now Tver’), and buried at sites in Katyn, outside Kharkov, as well as in Mednoye. Another
7,300 prisoners were shot in Belarus and Ukraine as part of the same operation. This series of
executions is referred to by the umbrella term ‘Katyn’. Themajority of those executed at Katyn
were Polish reserve officers. According to the law of 9 April 1938 on compulsory conscription,
all unexempted graduate students were called up to the army as reserve officers. As a result,
those executed included doctors, professors, lawyers and priests (Fischer 2000; Sanford 2005).
During perestroika, Boris Yel’tsin conveyed documents proving the NKVD’s guilt to the
Polish side, and in 2000 a memorial complex was opened at the site of the executions.
2In 2009 Katyn was mentioned 43 times in The Guardian, compared to an average of three times per year in
the period 2000–2008. At the time of the initial revelations in the early 1990s Katyn also figured in the
English-language press: in 1990–1995 The Guardian wrote about Katyn on average four times per year.
This may seem small, but asymmetry in the digital archives may account for the apparently much greater
interest in the late 2000s.
3Although precedents exist; see for instance Nikiporets-Takigawa (2013).
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The argument at Westerplatte was not the first time Katyn was brought up internationally,
but it was the first time the Russian side faced the issue head on. In 2005, Polish opposition
politicians cited Katyn as a reason why President Kwas´niewski should not participate in the
Victory Day celebrations in Moscow. The 2007 film Katyn, directed by Andrzej Wajda,
popularised the debate, made it accessible to international audiences, and revived and
reshaped the debate in Poland. The cases brought to the European Court of Human Rights,
where victims’ families demanded those executed be recognised as war crime victims, were
covered in the international media. Katyn gained further international significance following
the tragic death of President Kaczyn´ski and his entourage en route to the 70th anniversary
Katyn commemorations held in April 2010 near Smolensk, and later that year the Duma
officially reiterated Yel’tsin’s admission that Stalin was responsible for the massacre.
The existing literature and intellectual framework
Sheldon Stryker has pointed out that ‘Identity remains unproblematised and untheorised in
the social science literature’ (Stryker et al. 2000, p. 22). Identity can easily become a
residual category used to explain any variation unaccounted for by ‘universal’ models.
Especially in constructivist studies of international relations, ‘identity’ figures as a constant
that is said to explain irrational preferences; in other words, identity comes from the bottom
up, and the state’s representatives are subject to similar beliefs and preferences as the rest of
the population. Memory studies, in contrast, have been more open to analysing memory and
identity as convenient tools wielded by elites.
Katyn has been the subject of a number of historical monologues. These have dealt with
matters of historical truth, such as exposing the NKVD as the perpetrators of the crime
(Kisielewski 2008; Fitzgibbon 1972; Montfort 1966; Paul 2010; Stahl & Anders 1965; Stahl
et al. 1949; Trznadel 1994), the willingness of the allies to accept the Soviet cover-up story,
despite convincing evidence of their guilt, and the fact that the perpetrators were never
punished (Sanford 2005; Wolsza 2008). Little space has been devoted to the role Katyn has
played in Polish official discourse and memory politics since 1989. George Sanford,
Andrzej Przewoz´nik and Jolanta Adamska refer to ‘memory’ in the title of their studies, but
they mean the true memory of the Katyn massacre as opposed to the official lies, not the role
Katyn plays in Polish collective memory (Sanford 2005; Przewoz´nik & Adamska 2010).
Polish collective memory expert Barbara Szacka refers to Katyn only in passing,
highlighting the massacre’s role in shifting Polish identity-creation through othering away
from Germany and towards Russia (Szacka 2006).
More recently, Katyn has become a paradigmatic case in memory studies. A current
project led by Alexander Etkind—‘Memory at War’—devoted its inaugural conference
to the issue in June 2011, subsequently resulting in a publication (Etkind et al. 2012).
The project examines four types of memory conflict: those performed by texts, initiated by
individuals, by nation states, and by ‘transnational dynamics of culture’ (Etkind 2010).
An affiliated project at the University of Helsinki focuses on the ‘use of history as a political
weapon’ by state-level actors (Kangaspuro 2010). The ‘Memory at War’ model examines
the political mainly in the clashes of national representatives internationally; this article
contends that these clashes may be domestically motivated, and only ostensibly about
achieving foreign policy objectives. A number of studies discuss related cases as instances
of elite activated memory. These tend to describe ethnically divided nations, where memory
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disputes are blatantly antagonistic to a national majority. For instance, Andrew Wilson
explores how rival Russian and Ukrainian historiographies both claimed the Donbas as
theirs, which aggravated tensions between the two nations (Wilson 1995). Stuart Burch and
David Smith examined Estonia’s ‘war of monuments’ in which the Russian minority’s
narrative whereby Estonia was liberated by the Red Army is increasingly at odds with
official monuments celebrating the Estonian resistance which sometimes bordered on Nazi
collaboration (Smith 2001; Burch & Smith 2007). A common theme is that politicians are
willing to shape cultural memory and use antagonistic rhetoric in order to increase their
popularity among native Estonians. In April 2007, PrimeMinister Andrus Ansip allowed the
Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, commemorating Red Army losses in Estonia during WWII, to be
removed from the city. On the one hand his popularity soared, but on the other, the Russian
minority felt alienated and angry (Bru¨ggemann & Kasekamp 2008; Burch & Smith 2007).
In Estonia, the effects of antagonistic rhetoric and controversial commemorative practices
were clear due to the Other being an internal one that could respond through riots and the
national media.
The concept of theOther is fundamental tomemory studies, as it is through interactionwith
the Other that the essence of the Self is made clear (Said 1978). Iver Neumann has argued that
‘Russia is liminal to European identity’ and the newEastern European states have portrayed it
as a brutal and uncivilised ‘Other’ (Neumann 2002, pp. 121–25); Katyn features prominently
in such arguments in Poland. Here I will heed Jeffrey Olick’s call not to ‘reinvent the wheel’
every time ‘we talk in terms of collective memory’ (Olick 2008, pp. 27, 26) and instead refer
to Olick et al.’s (2011) overview of this literature. Identity emerges in the borderlands
where the Self and Other meet, and it is the maintenance of borders that creates identity
(Barth 1969). Events that highlight distinctiveness do not emerge by themselves, they are
chosen: Habermas and Derrida emphasise that ‘historical experiences are only candidates for
self-conscious appropriation; without such a self-conscious act they cannot attain the power
to shape our identity’ (Habermas & Derrida 2003, p. 295). In other words, elites attempt to
shape identity in a particular direction by highlighting one historical experience over another.
According to this view, historical events are activated in order to epitomise the nature of the
Other and to justify an antagonistic position, rather than expressly as part of foreign policy.
Identity forming Othering tends to be discussed as to some degree artificially constructed.
Benedict Anderson (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) see national
identity respectively as a social or an elite-led construct. Anderson sees identity as imagined,
but not as false; to Hobsbawm and Ranger identity is actively created by elites for political
purposes, while Ernest Gellner contends that (nationalist) identity is deliberately constructed
to satisfy politicians’ needs (Gellner 2008). In this top-down view of identity formation elites
emphasise an interpretation of historical events that attributes a popular meaning to them,
thus gaining legitimacy in the eyes of (at least part of) the electorate, and consequently
increasing their (political) power.
In contrast, the constructivist school in International Relations attempted to operationalise
national identity as a constant that may account for variation in countries’ foreign policy
preferences (Jepperson et al. 1996; Aggestam 1999). Identity is held to be ‘relatively stable’
and formed in discourse;4 it is maintained by discourse due to ongoing practices that
4Foucault sees discourse as a set of rules and practices that give a text meaning within a particular context.
Discourse is about how knowledge is produced through language (McHoul 1993).
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‘represent self and other in certain ways’ (Wendt 1994, p. 386). Because national identity is
maintained in domestic discourse, it influences the state’s foreign policy preferences and
may explain ‘irrational’ foreign policy priorities (Larsen 1997, pp. 3–33; Waever 1995).
Polish accounts approaching Katyn from a foreign policy perspective tend to narrate the
chronology of Russian–Polish negotiations, but lack analysis about Katyn’s significance
beyond Russia’s admission of guilt and the ongoing legal disputes (Kuz´niar 2001, 2009; Gil
& Kapus´niak 2009; Madera 2003; Strzelczyk 2002). In practice identity is overwhelmingly
described as very stable. The only systematic study applying constructivism to Polish
eastern policy was conducted by Sebastian Gerhardt, who based his study on a research
design developed by PAFE (Project on the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policies in
Europe), a project conducted at the University of Tu¨bingen (Gerhardt 2007, p. 6). PAFE sees
identity as ‘a cognitive frame of reference to be activated through social communication
processes’ (PAFE 2003, p. 1). When analysing Western European states, PAFE found
‘an astonishing degree of continuity’ in ‘foreign policy identities’ (Maull et al. 2002, p. 16).
In contrast, Gerhardt concluded, there was no one dominant privileged storyteller in Poland
and considerable fragmentation in foreign policy discourse (Gerhardt 2007). Gerhardt’s
study demonstrated how historical events do not yet have a stable position within a Polish
identity which is still actively contested. In contrast to scholars highlighting state-level
memory conflict, Joanna Gorska presented Polish–Russian relations as characterised by
realist concerns, and found constructivist arguments explaining Katyn’s significance to be
unsatisfactory (Gorska 2010).
An outline of the study
Hypotheses
Most broadly, this study attempts to establish whether Katyn is invoked in order to achieve
domestic or international results. Identity as operationalised by constructivists is thought of as
stable, and state-level actors defend the national interest internationally. Alternatively,
identity disputes are sometimes seen as serving individual actors, that is, identity disputes are
motivated by the domestic situation. It is hard to distinguish between international and
domestic motivation as politicians invariably claim to act in the national interest rather than
for personal gain. All this is not to say that individual efforts, historical findings, or judicial
proceedings will not affect the significance of the event or the patterns in which it is debated.
However, the study does assume that efforts such as those by the Katyn families will be
relatively constant, while the voice given to them by politicians at international summits or in
sympatheticmedia outletsmay vary. To this end the study examines the presence and absence
of statements about Katyn during elections and state visits to unpack the reasons why
politicians were interested in Katyn. This leads to the formation of the hypotheses below.
Constructivists such as Wendt (1999) treat foreign policy as an outcome of national
identity as already formed within the political community. Actors may pursue ideas
internationally even if these undermine ‘rational’ concerns such as security, since their
actions must be acceptable to the national community that shares the identity of which the
actors themselves are a product.
This leads to the null hypothesis: the role Katyn plays in identity discourse will be relatively
stable over time since it features prominently in a repositioned post-communist identity.
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Alternatively, if identity is considered a tool used by elites, then activating traumatic
memory may be thought of as a strategy that has specific costs and payoffs: antagonistically
pursuing historical justice and truth in the international sphere comes at the cost of
damaging relations with a country’s neighbours. Why then do politicians do this?
This leads us to the first alternative hypothesis (1A): political actors invoke contested
memories such as Katyn to achieve domestic legitimacy and to achieve a distinctive
ideological position. Escalations in memory conflicts will therefore frequently coincide with
elections, since contested memories serve a mobilising function.
The costs and payoffs will vary depending on the degree to which actors need to balance
the domestic and international consequences of antagonistic discourse.
Consequently I propose an additional hypothesis (1B): the cost of tendentious historical
interpretations is high for government actors who seek good relations with their neighbours.
Opposition actors are not constrained and therefore are more likely to interpret historical
events antagonistically.
Methodology and data collection
This study uses quantitative methods to test the hypotheses above. Mapping the volume and
tone of references to Katyn will document temporal variation in the debate. Multiple linear
regression tests control for fluctuations in discourse due to independent variables such as elite
statements, annual commemorations, parliamentary and presidential elections, meetings
between heads of state, and changes to the domestic political scene. Shocks caused by specific
events such as the release of Wajda’s 2007 film Katyn are controlled for. Variation in debate
immediately before or after elections, or depending on whether PiS was in government or not,
will support the alternative hypotheses that the domestic political calendar affects the presence
of memory disputes. Similarly, Katyn is often debated at times when Polish and Russian
leaders meet. Differentiation in the frequency of mentions at these junctures, depending on
whether bilateral relations are good or bad, will also undermine the hypothesis of stability, as if
relations are already bad, disputing Katyn is unlikely to jeopardise bilateral agreements.
Political speeches and statements by elite actors provide data for one of the tests, but the
sample size is small and the data incomplete, so the test should be seen in conjunction with
those drawing on media sources. The main data source is articles in two Polish daily
newspapers, the conservative Rzeczpospolita (RZ), and the more liberal Gazeta Wyborcza
(GW). The two newspapers contrast strongly in their assessment of PiS and Kaczyn´ski’s
policies. RZ is used as a proxy for rhetoric associated with the Polish right, while GW
figures as a control sample. Major differences between the publication patterns of the two
papers are most likely due to different significance attributed to Katyn. It makes sense to use
RZ as a proxy as sympathetic media are the main means for political elites to communicate
their stance to the electorate. During the 2000s, changes to the RZ editorial board saw the
newspaper align with PiS. After Grzegorz Gauden was named editor in 2004 the paper
tentatively moved to the right. Paweł Lisicki was appointed editor in chief in September
2006, and he proclaimed a new course for the paper, declaring that henceforth ‘with regards
to morals and tradition RZ will be a conservative paper’ (Lisicki 2011).Gazeta Wyborcza, in
contrast, started out as the mouthpiece of the Solidarity camp. It tends to be more liberal than
RZ. GW and RZ have clashed most strongly regarding Solidarity’s legacy in Poland’s
negotiated transition from communism.
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Katyn figures prominently in Polish discourse, therefore no attempt was made at an
exhaustive study. Instead, all mentions of Katyn in RZ and GW were collected and grouped
by month of publication. A more thorough inspection of the data was aimed at identifying
how Katyn was related to arguments about Polish–Russian relations. This was done by
mapping the distribution of texts where Katyn was activated as part of an argument hostile to
Russia. Peaks in this distribution were then examined more closely, and the patterns of the
discourse were examined and contextualised. Keyword searches do not distinguish between
articles dedicated to Katyn and other articles referring to Katyn only in passing; such errors
should be consistent for the whole dataset, leading to ‘white noise’ or a relatively large
constant, but should not fundamentally affect the results. The chosen method is also
problematic in that it does not capture the tone of the debate; a controversial opinion piece
will have been more significant than will a passing reference. To counter some of these
problems, three searches were conducted: one for the number of articles mentioning Katyn
per year, another per month, and a third for articles specifically linking Katyn and Russia. As
the latter search yielded fewer results, the data could be analysed and subdivided into three
categories: articles sympathetic to Russia, critical of Russia, and articles referring to Russia
within the context of an internal Polish debate. The data were limited to the period from
January 2000 to March 2010 because of the tragedy at Smolensk in April 2010. While the
Russian debate about Katyn arguably only really started after the crash,5 in Poland it
resulted in the debate moving on: most references to Katyn since have related not to the
massacre but to the President’s death, while most references critical of Russia have sowed
doubt about the Russian investigators’ competence or even accused Putin of masterminding
the attack. It is too early to tell whether this ‘Katyn II’, as it was termed, has fully superseded
‘Katyn I’, but the issue of how the tragedy at Smolensk has been mobilised is a sufficiently
different issue to warrant a separate analysis.6
When is Katyn debated?
The null hypothesis posits that identity debates should reveal a degree of stability.
To examine this, the number of mentions of Katyn per year is mapped in Figure 1.
The publication history of the two newspapers is very highly correlated (0.96), which
suggests the same underlying factors drive the variation in press coverage. In both outlets,
the invoking of Katyn was relatively stable until the mid-2000s, whereupon there was a
substantial increase in references. The peaks in 1995, 2000 and 2005 are probably accounted
for by these being anniversary years (Katyn occurred in 1940), but the subsequent peaks are
not explained by anniversaries alone. The same basic pattern was observed when controlling
for the total number of articles published, so the growth in the number of articles about
Katyn is not due to increased publication or incomplete archival records. A more accurate
picture is given by subdividing the annual data into monthly sections (as shown in Figure 2).
5This is not to suggest that no one in Russia knew about Katyn prior to April 2010, merely to point out that
any public debate was limited to liberal opposition newspapers. This is well exemplified by the reporting on
Wajda’s Katyn in Russia: the film was screened only twice prior to 2010, and mentions of the film in pro-
Kremlin publications labelled the film as dealing with World War II tragedies, rather than a massacre
conducted by the NKVD. Until 2010 there were only few mentions of who actually was killed at Katyn as
ambiguity with the Belorussian village Khatyn, burnt by the Nazis and a Soviet memorial site of Nazi
aggression, was rarely avoided if not actively encouraged.
6See for instance De Bruyn (2010), and the chapter ‘Coda: “Katyn-2”’ in Etkind et al. (2012).
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Figure 2 reveals a few characteristics of the debate: peaks in the debate have
become greater over time, and since mid-2007 Katyn coverage has consistently been high.
The escalation of the debate after 2007 suggests that the issue changed from being
periodically remembered to becoming an issue of day-to-day import. This corroborates Piotr
Kosicki’s finding that Wajda’s film unleashed a renaissance of memory about Katyn in
Poland (Kosicki 2011).
Clearly, GW and RZ have similar but not identical publication patterns. Regression
analysis allows an assessment of the degree to which different factors drive debate in papers
associated with distinctive political views. In the model provided in Figure 3, variables are
grouped into five categories. For the sake of consistency, all variables significant for either
dataset were included in all tests.
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF MENTIONS OF ‘KATYN’ PER YEAR, (1990–2010).
FIGURE 2. MONTHLY FLUCTUATION IN NUMBERS OF MENTIONS OF ‘KATYN’ (JANUARY
2000–MARCH 2010).
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Results
These tests are run in order to elicit the circumstances under which Katyn is invoked in
discourse. The null hypothesis suggests that Katyn will be invoked in a relatively stable
manner. The ‘anniversaries’ variables should therefore be of the greatest significance.
The alternative hypotheses suggest that specific domestic and international payoffs inform
the degree to which Katyn figures in discourse. Table 1 displays how much variation
each cluster of variables can explain in isolation for the GW dataset. The results for RZ were
substantially similar. Domestic and international variables both have some explanatory
power, while the elections and anniversaries variables do not.
FIGURE 3. MODEL.
Group Variable name Rationale 
Shocks as
dummies:
Wajda’s Katyn Wajda’s film was the topic of many articles at the time of its
release (September 2007), when nominated for an Oscar 
(January 2008), and when released in Russia (March 2008).
The lagged variable contols for residual coverage in the
following month.
Wajda’s Katyn (Lag)  
‘Anniversaries’
variables
April commemorations 
Five-year
commemorations
WWII commemorations 
‘Elections’
variables
Campaign Katyn may figure in the run-up to elections as political parties
interpret the event as part of national identity, or invoke the
memory of Katyn to criticise the incumbents. Variables
controlling for election campaigns (last three months before
election), the period following elections (three months after
election), as well as changes in government are included.
Change of government 
Election aftermath 
‘Bilateral
relations’
Russian–Polish crises 
Run-up to state visits 
State visit and no crisis 
State visit and crisis 
Tension and no state visit 
‘Russia’ in GW To control for increased publishing about Russia.
‘Politics’
variables
EU membership2 Relations with Russia may have changed following EU
accession.
Left-wing government Left-wing governments may be more inclined to pursue good
relations with Russia.
PiS governments PiS are credited with pursuing a foreign policy hostile to
Russia.
Cohabitation Periods where Kaczynski was president but PO were in
government might result in increased ideological conflict
between elite actors.
Annual commemorative events lead to more reporting in the
press. Events commemorating Katyn (April 1940) and the
outbreak of WWII (September 1939) are controlled for.
Increased conflict over Katyn may be related to external
tensions with Russia. The variable state visit has been split with
one variable capturing visits during periods of normal relations
and another during crises as defined according to the Reuters
factbox of Polish–Russian relations.1 Run-up to state visit
captures the month before a visit; state visit captures month of
visit.
Notes: 1 ‘Factbox: Polish–Russian Relations’, Reuters, available at:
htp://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/06/us-poland-russia-relations-idUSTRE6B52OL20101206, accessed 6
May 2014.
2
 This variable was consistently found to be insignificant and therefore removed.
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The period of cohabitation is associated with an increase in mentions of Katyn, as are
state visits during times of tension. The nested model in Table 2 shows how the variables
complement each other.
The ‘anniversaries’ and ‘elections’ variables, found to be insignificant in isolation,
contribute significantly to the overall picture. Adding the ‘Wajda’ variablemore than doubles
the adjusted r-squared score, so it should be remembered that throughout this study high r-
squared scores are the result of being able to account for the increased publication that
accompanied the film’s release. All groups of variables appear to have some explanatory
power: the ‘cohabitation’ variable remains highly significant, while meetings during periods
of tension are also associated with more frequent mentions of Katyn. The importance of
elections is less clear: there appears to be an increase in references at timeswhen governments
have changed, though this is not the case for the run-up to or the aftermath of an election. It is
interesting to note some of the variables that are insignificant: there is no increase associated
with PiS’s term in office or during periods of tension and crisis. These findings suggest that
variation in the debate is non-random. The RZ data suggest similar relationships. RZ
mentioned Katyn more frequently than GW, so one would expect on average higher
coefficients. Comparatively the paper devoted less attention to Wajda’s Katyn, but
substantiallymore to state visits. In particular, the run-up to state visits, aswell as visits during
periods of good relations, are significant explanatory variables for RZ’s publishing patterns.
Again, the period of cohabitation emerges as one of intensified debate. Unlike in the GW
sample, changes in government were not significant. Particularly the variation in the ‘state
visits’ variables suggests that the international dimension is approached differently
depending on political orientation. Similarly, the ‘state visits’ variables demonstrate that
acceleration in the Katyn debate is most common at times of Polish–Russian crises.
Cumulatively these findings suggest that the debate is not as stable as the null hypothesis
TABLE 1
KATYN IN GAZETA WYBORCZA, JANUARY 2000–MARCH 2010, 746 TEXTS
Anniversaries Elections Russia Political
April commemorations 1.59
5-year commemorations 3.59
WWII commemorations 2.11
Campaign 0.80
Change of government 3.64
Election aftermath 0.31
Russian–Polish crisis 21.53
Run-up to state visit 1.29
State visit & no crisis 20.52
State visit & crisis 7.44*
Tension & no state visit 22.81
Russia in Gazeta Wyborcza 0.05**
Cohabitation 4.47*
Left-wing government 22.45
PiS government 20.82
Poland in EU 1.41
Constant 3.79*** 4.36*** 21.49 3.81***
Adjusted R squared 0.022 20.014 0.107 0.249
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
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suggested, aswell as showing that compared toGW,RZ ismore interested in the political than
the cultural and commemorative aspects of Katyn.
Katyn in party ideology
During the 1990s the Polish party system was highly volatile, with few parties other than the
post-Soviet SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) displaying any continuity between
electoral cycles. In 2001 the SLD together with the UP (Unia Pracy) entered a coalition
government. The 2005 election saw the decline of the left-wing SLD, and the permanent
fracturing of the post-Solidarity block into PO and PiS. As the communist successor
party became less significant as the main political opposition, the post-Solidarity parties
PO and PiS realigned themselves against each other. At this time observers began to
characterise Poland as a two-party state, as PO and PiS between them held the vast
majority of seats in the Sejm.7 In 2005 PiS entered coalition government with the more
radical Samoobrona (Self Defence) and LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin). The coalition
did not last long though, and both of these parties disappeared from the Polish
political landscape. In both the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections PiS and PO between
them gained 70% of the vote.
TABLE 2
KATYN IN GAZETA WYBORCZA AND RZECZPOSPOLITA, JANUARY 2000–MARCH 2010, NESTED
MODEL
Katyn in Gazeta Wyborcza
January 2000–March
2010, 746 texts
Katyn in Rzeczpospolita
January 2000–March
2010, 1812 texts
Political Russia Anniversaries Elections All All
Cohabitation 4.47* 2.91 4.65 6.75* 5.46** 7.65**
Left-wing government 22.45 22.40 21.63 20.24 20.86 20.98
PiS government 20.82 20.59 1.02 2.53 0.45 20.71
Poland in EU 1.41 1.94 0.99 0.08 0.03 2.98
Russian–Polish crisis 1.01 20.77 20.63 0.25 20.11
Run-up to state visit 0.88 0.38 1.32 1.15 5.70**
State visit & no crisis 0.31 1.07 1.03 1.90 5.97*
State visit & crisis 6.00 4.43 5.02 6.34** 20.06***
Tension & no state visit 2.59 22.36 23.37 22.87 22.19
Russia in Gazeta Wyborcza 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 20.02
April commemorations 1.95 2.23 2.62* 7.81***
5-year commemorations 3.54 4.07* 3.70** 6.81***
WWII commemorations 1.64 0.52 0.53 2.10
Campaign 3.51* 1.04 1.59
Change of government 6.07* 4.89* 1.47
Election aftermath 0.04 0.68 21.35
Wajda’s Katyn 29.30*** 20.70***
Wajda’s Katyn (lag) 5.14* 12.30**
Constant 3.81*** 0.44 20.36 22.04 1.13 7.34**
Adjusted R squared 0.249 0.271 0.292 0.317 0.744 0.670
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
7See for example Markowski (2006).
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Both PiS and PO trace their routes to the Solidarity movement and occupy a similar
position on the left–right spectrum, but they differ in their attitude to the communist
legacy and the negotiated transition. The parties disagree about the nature of the
communist legacy, and PiS has mobilised Katyn as epitomising communist crimes against
the nation.
PiS, founded by the twins Jarosław and Lech Kaczyn´ski in 2001, drew on the Church’s
teachings, Polish traditions, and Poland’s historical experiences as its main intellectual
sources. PiS vehemently rejected the negotiated compromise from communism, a view first
expressed by Jan Moczulski and the Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Maj & Wo´jcik
2008, pp. 16–19, 36). To Moczulski, the 1989 Round Table discussions led by Tadeusz
Mazowiecki were an act of treachery, as the legal structure of the PRL (Polish People’s
Republic—Polska Rzecspospolita Ludowa) could not form the basis for a post-socialist
system. Key Solidarity actors had been compromised by contact with the communist
authorities, and a vetting system (lustration) was needed to ensure that anyone tainted
was kept away from political office (Maj & Wo´jcik 2008, pp. 16–19, 36). PiS’s vision saw
Poland as threatened by two eternal foes, Russia and Germany, who sought to destroy any
independent Poland. For this reason Polish foreign policy should therefore be aimed
against these two neighbours (Maj &Wo´jcik 2008, pp. 44–45, 102). In 2003 Paweł S´piewak
re-launched the term ‘IV Republic’, claiming a new Republic was needed to eradicate the
ills society had suffered during the accelerated transformation from communism (S´piewak
2003). In March 2005, PiS embraced the idea as part of a new ‘Polish Constitution’ during
their parliamentary election campaign. The IV Republic’s Constitution had its ‘foundation
in anti-communism’ (PiS 2003) and called for ‘the renewal of morality in public life’, ‘the
fighting of corruption’, and the ‘removal of Communist agents’ from positions of authority
(Gmyz 2010).8 According to PiS, the system (układ) that seized power in the early 1990s
was dominated by a post-communist elite made up of secret agents, politicians,
interest groups and business. The układ was to blame for the ills of modern Poland, and
became the target of the Kaczyn´skis’ political efforts (Bartoszewski & Su¨ssmuth 2008, p. 7;
Kaczyn´ski 2006).
To PiS, Katyn became the main symbol that epitomises communist crimes against
Poland, and as Lech Kaczyn´ski made clear at Westerplatte, ought to be seen as a symbol
parallel to Auschwitz. For this reason PiS were at the forefront of the call to acknowledge
the events at Katyn as genocide. The term genocide implies that the purpose of Katyn was to
cripple the Polish nation, and was therefore the most extreme case of the general Soviet
policy towards Poland, and similar to that of Nazi Germany according to which Poles were
Untermenschen (Wildstein 2009). Illustrative of the emergence of the anti-communist
memory of the war was PiS’s promotion of the equal commemoration of 17 September, the
date of the Soviet invasion, and 1 September, the day the Nazis invaded Poland. In the early
2000s, Poles did not associate the date 17 September with any particular event, but by 2008,
50% of Poles were able to identify it as the date the Soviet Union invaded Poland. Yet, this
fact was given negative spin in Rzeczpospolita, where one author lamented how only one in
two Poles knew the significance of this date (Zdort 2008). This ignorance was attributed to
poor ‘memory work’ by the III Republic’s elites. The fact that only in 2007 had a film been
8‘IV Rzeczpospolita’, Rzeczpospolita, 15 December 2005, available at: http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/
kat,43834,title,IV-Rzeczpospolita,wid,8118743,wiadomosc.html?ticaid¼112a7b, accessed 10 April 2011.
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made about Katyn exposed the authorities’ negligent approach to the memory of Soviet
aggression (Stro´z˙yk 2008).
Data were also collected from PiS press releases that mentioned Katyn. It should be noted
that the data are incomplete for the period prior to 2006. Figure 4 shows that PiS has
commented on the issue more frequently during the decade, while, with the exception of
April 2010, PO rarely referred to the issue. This variation in interest by the two parties
contributes to disproving the stability hypothesised.
Table 3 confirms that PiS have been more vocal since leaving government; this is
indicated by the ‘cohabitation’ variable’s coefficient being higher and more significant than
the ‘PiS government’ variable. Tensions with Russia are not in themselves significant, but
state visits and crises are the best predictor of the pronouncements of PiS on Katyn, showing
that antagonistic statements about Katyn tend to occur when relations are already bad.
There was a notable acceleration in Katyn debates somewhere in the middle of the
decade. If discourse was stable then the ‘anniversaries’ variable should have relatively
stable explanatory power. When limiting the regressions to 2000–2006, the ‘anniversaries’
variables explain 35% of the variation in the RZ data and 25% of the variation in the GW
data. For the decade as a whole, these variables explain only 12.5% and 2.2%, respectively.
We noted above that until the mid-2000s the ‘commemoration’ variables had good
explanatory power, but that this changed. It seems that political elites, in particular those
associated with PiS, escalated the debate; only this can account for the prominence of Katyn
in the Polish press since 2006. PiS’s statements may be contrasted with PO’s: the adjusted
r-squared score is very low for the latter, and overall the variables have limited explanatory
power. PiS have therefore more actively invoked Katyn at key junctures than have PO. This
variation shows that some actors are more inclined to invoke memory of national trauma
than others. Figure 4 shows that PO’s coverage was relatively stable while PiS’s escalated.
FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO ‘KATYN’ BY POLITICIANS (JANUARY 2000–
MARCH 2010).
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The hypotheses positing stability on the one hand and political calculation on the other are
thus not mutually exclusive; it would seem Katyn has become increasingly significant to
PiS, while to PO its significance has remained relatively stable. Thus, the null hypothesis is
appropriate for explaining PO’s interest, while additional factors such as those stipulated in
the alternative hypotheses are needed to explain PiS’s usage. As the data are incomplete
these conclusions cannot be drawn too far, but it should be clear that Polish political parties
approach Katyn very differently.
Katyn and criticism of Russia
Katyn features in discourse critical of Russia due to the idea that Poland was equally the
victim of Soviet and Nazi aggression. Thus far we have seen that political actors are more
likely to speak about Katyn if relations with Russia are already bad. In this next section the
articles mentioning Katyn in relation to Russia were subdivided into those broadly
sympathetic to and those critical of Russian actions and by implication the Russian state.
Examining these more closely reveals that intensified criticism of Russia was due more to
disputes with Polish liberals than to Russian actions. Gazeta Wyborcza frequently criticised
PiS for its insensitive comments, while RZ criticised GW for being excessively
‘Russophile’. These findings demonstrate that PiS focuses on Katyn in order to illustrate
why good relations with Russia are impossible.
Critical articles in RZ, displayed in Table 4, are best explained by the ‘state visits’
variable, cohabitation, and election aftermath. Critical opinions were thus less frequently
TABLE 3
VARIABLES EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PARTIES’ INTEREST
Law and Order (PiS) January 2000–
March 2010, 212 texts
Civic Platform (PO), January 2000–
March 2010, 48 texts
All All
Cohabitation 2.03* 0.53*
PiS government 1.27 0.10
Poland in EU 20.10 20.12
Russian–Polish crisis 20.30 0.24
Run-up to state visit 0.95 20.07
State visit & no crisis 20.85 20.30
State visit & crisis 6.37*** 0.05
Tension & no state visit 21.45 20.71*
Russia in Gazeta Wyborcza 20.01 0.00
April commemorations 1.04 0.03
5-year commemorations 0.51 0.42
WWII commemorations 1.84* 0.37
Campaign 0.22 0.02
Change of government 1.42 0.58
Election aftermath 0.06 0.02
Wajda’s Katyn 5.47** 20.40
Wajda’s Katyn (lag) 1.29 20.50
Constant 0.29 20.36
Adjusted R squared 0.328 0.151
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
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aired immediately following elections and more frequently when PiS was in opposition.
It is interesting to note that the ‘election’ variables are significant for critical articles,
but not for the data as a whole. This suggests anti-Russian rhetoric featuring Katyn is
disproportionately invoked during elections, rather than purely as part of identity debates.
These findings support the suggestion that criticism of Russia is driven more strongly by the
domestic political calendar than coverage of Katyn as a whole.
Is the target of criticism actually Russia?
To highlight the dynamics of the Polish debate the month with the largest number of articles
critical of Russia was examined. Twenty-four such articles appeared in September 2009, at
the time both of Putin’s arrival at Westerplatte and the 17 September commemorations.
In both cases, Katyn was discussed extensively in the media, not because Russia made
an unambiguously hostile move or due directly to commemorations, but because their
significance was internally disputed. A closer look at the argument in these two cases will
highlight that the debate is only ostensibly about Russia; actually, it relates to the adequacy
of the Polish government’s foreign policy.
The controversy surrounding the wording of the Sejm’s resolution on Soviet aggression was
important because the basis for Polish–Russian relations was disputed: PiS was keen to make
Katyn the bottom-line in bilateral talks, while POwas more concerned about ensuring the talks
were productive. Lech Kaczyn´ski called for the resignation of the Sejm’s vice-marshal
Stefan Niesołowski for ‘exceeding all standards of disloyalty to his country’ after the latter
suggested there had been only two examples of genocide in history: the Holocaust and the
TABLE 4
COVERAGE ABOUT KATYN AND RUSSIA IN RZECZPOSPOLITA
Critical 273 texts Sympathetic 211 texts
Cohabitation 3.22** 1.01
Left-wing government 0.36 0.22
PiS government 0.59 0.56
Poland in EU 0.41 20.37
Russian–Polish crisis 0.74 20.31
Run-up to state visit 2.10** 0.67
State visit & no crisis 0.54 2.45***
State visit & crisis 10.37*** 0.70
Tension & no state visit 20.59 0.30
Russia in Gazeta Wyborcza 20.02* 20.00
April commemorations 0.25 0.17
5-year commemorations 1.56* 2.40***
WWII commemorations 0.39 20.37
Campaign 0.08 0.16
Change of government 20.07 20.04
Election aftermath 21.46* 20.63
Wajda’s Katyn 0.67 2.28*
Wajda’s Katyn (lag) 0.44 1.69
Constant 1.67 0.76
Adjusted R squared 0.582 0.284
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
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holodomor in Ukraine.9 The view that Katyn was genocide is based on a particularly inimical
view of communism: ‘Hitler’s goal, as Stalin’s . . . was the destruction of Polish national
identity . . . and Katyn was only one element of that project common to the Soviets and Nazis’
(Terlikowski 2009). RZ presented opinion polls claiming that 61% of Poles supported PiS’s
demand that Katyn be classified as genocide, and asked rhetorically whether the politicians
would abide by the will of the people (Gmyz & Stro´z˙yk 2009). PO’s reluctance to accept the
project led PiS to criticise their ‘soft-policy’ towards Russia (Manys 2009). In this way PiS
categorised its position on Katyn as the centre ground from which the government made
concessions. Commentators such as Bronisław Wildstein wrote that the absence of the word
genocide would signify a Polish retreat on this issue, and went on to criticise PO’s ‘historical
politics’ (Wildstein2009),whileMarekDomagalskiwent further, claiming that ‘denyingKatyn
the attribute genocide is an outrageous, unjustified revision of general knowledge on that topic’
(Domagalski 2009). Despite an embarrassing episode where the head of the Federacja Rodzin
Katynskich, anorganisationPiS purported to support,went on record saying thatKatyn neednot
be classified as genocide (Kołakowska 2009), PresidentKaczyn´ski publicly claimedKatynwas
genocide and the product of ‘great-Russian chauvinism’ (Wybranowski 2009).
Putin’s visitwas controversial because Polish politicianswere divided as to its significance:
did his conciliatory statements belittle Poland, or were they a positive step? Mariusz
Błaszczak, PiS’s spokesperson, protested against Putin’s wording, while Paweł Gras´,
representing the government, considered Putin’s message a positive one, albeit not entirely in
accord with Polish interpretations (Kubiak&Wybranowski 2009). RZwas keen to show how
inadequate Putin’s statement was: he had placed toomuch emphasis on the RedArmy freeing
Poland, placed the People’s Army (Armia Ludowa) on the same level as the Home Army
(ArmiaKrajowa), aswell asmaking reference to Soviet losses in Polish prisoner ofwar camps
in 1919–1920 (Zychowicz 2009). Rather than embracing a change of rhetoric, PiS
emphasised how Moscow sent contradictory messages (Prus 2009), and RZ editor Lisicki
termed Putin’s call for ‘mutual forgiveness’ ‘scandalous’ (Lisicki 2009). Kaczyn´ski directed
his speech at Westerplatte against the Russian delegation through poorly veiled references to
Russia’s ‘neo-imperialist’ attack on Georgia in 2008. After Kaczyn´ski apologised for the
Polish occupation of Czechoslovakian territories in 1938 (most notably the town of Cieszyn),
he asserted that ‘we Poles are able to confess our sins’, and ‘we Poles have the right to access
the truth’, before ending his speech directly criticising the comparison of Katyn to Red Army
deaths in 1920 as ‘hindering reconciliation’ (Kaczyn´ski 2009). Tusk, in his speech, stated
unambiguously that theMolotov–Ribbentrop pact had led to war in Poland, but reminded his
listeners that it was not the prime minister’s role to ‘conduct a historical dispute’. He
mentioned that Westerplatte, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and Katyn were historical facts
that might be ‘differently assessed’ but never disputed (Uhlig 2009).
Hypothesis 1B suggests that the cost of aggressive foreign policy rhetoric is different for
ruling and opposition groupings as ruling elites have to deal with the external ramifications.
The president’s role, though significant, is largely a symbolic one in Poland, but he does
have a say in foreign policy and frequently attends summits and bilateral meetings. During
the period of cohabitation, PiS used the office of the president to promote a more aggressive
foreign policy to the detriment of the government’s eastern policy. Evidence for this is
9‘“Chcemy odwołania Niesiołowskiego”’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 September 2009, available at: http://www.
rp.pl/artykul/361166.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
ROLF FREDHEIM1180
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
09
:21
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
provided by opinion polls: in 2008, 86% of Poles felt government and president failed to
cooperate in the sphere of foreign policy (Strzeszewski 2008, p. 3). Over the next two years,
as a result of the conflict between president and government, Katyn was perceived as an ever
larger problem: in 2008, 67% of respondents felt Katyn hindered normal Polish–Russian
relations, a figure that grew to 81% in 2010 (Pankowski 2010, pp. 2–6).
Russia the Other as an opposition strategy?
In this final section the dataset is further refined as texts that clearly employ an othering
strategy, equating Poland with truth and Russia with lies, are highlighted. It demonstrates
that the most aggressive rhetoric is clustered around Polish elections.
In initial tests, elections did not appear to be the most significant factor underlying
the debate. Nonetheless, they did matter, as illustrated by the controversy surrounding the
failure of the EU parliament to observe a one minute’s silence in 2005, timed to precede the
legislative and presidential elections later that year. Similarly, PiS’s campaign against
Kwas´niewski’s visit to Moscow took place shortly before the 2005 parliamentary elections.
A PiS party political broadcast in May 2005 on Polish state television stated: ‘Hitler and
Soviet Russia’s attack cost us six million people and half a century of enslavement. Now
Russia would have us thank them for Yalta’. Then the broadcast moved on to Katyn:
‘Moscow refuses to classify this crime as genocide’. Lech Kaczyn´ski then said the president
should not go to Moscow because ‘today Russia wants to humble Poland because we can’t
be ordered about’ (Majda 2005). The Russian foreign office even protested against the
broadcast, an act which Kaczyn´ski described as ‘meddling with internal Polish affairs’
(Majda 2005). PiS pushed emotionally charged issues, such as Russia’s reluctance to reopen
the Katyn case, in order to receive wider pre-election coverage. The extensive references to
Katyn as the cornerstone of Polish–Russian relations was part of a campaign directed
against the post-communist party SLD and incumbent President Aleksander Kwas´niewski.
Hypothesis 1A states that historical memory may serve a mobilising function, while
hypothesis 1B suggests opposition actors are more likely to exploit this. Revisiting Figure 2,
which compares GW and RZ publication patterns, reveals that in early 2005 RZ had an
anomalous peak in coverage of Katyn. The shaded area representing PiS’s period in
government in Figure 2 confirms that that coverage was consistently low during this
period, as none of the major peaks in discussion fell within PiS’s term in government.
The impression that pushing the Katyn question specifically, and historical memory more
generally, was a tactic employed by PiS when in opposition is inescapable.
In April 2005, Katyn was used on the Polish side of a value-laden division between Polish
and Russian interpretations of the War: the Russian Victory celebrations in May emphasised
Soviet heroism, while Katyn showed Russian treachery, lies and denial. The division
between Russian lies and Polish truth became embedded in the rhetoric surrounding Katyn.
Titles such as ‘Crime, lies, silence, truth’, ‘Years of fighting for the truth’, ‘They testified to
the truth’, ‘Only the truth’, ‘Between two enemies’, and ‘Moscow does not believe in tears’
illustrate the rhetoric used (Kaczyn´ski 2005a, 2005b; Marzec 2005; Ordyn´ski 2005;
Adamska 2005; Łe˛towski 2005). In May 2005, Russia was accused of being responsible for
the outbreak of WWII and reinstating the Stalin cult. Soldiers in the victory parade were
described as ‘Russian mercenaries who murdered and tortured the Chechens (willingly and
for pay)’ (Kurczab-Redlich 2005), and the Russian army’s intervention in Chechnya was
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likened to the NKVD’s crimes against Poles. Increasingly ‘Russian’ and ‘Soviet’ were used
interchangeably (Piwowar 2009); in a party broadcast Lech Kaczyn´ski spoke of Soviet
Russia rather than the Soviet Union (Majda 2005). The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany
were presented as equally responsible for Polish wartime losses and the war itself, while
Katyn and Yalta featured as negative slogans. Throughout, PiS employed emotive terms
such as ‘enslavement’, ‘genocide’, ‘humiliation’, and ‘meddling’ when discussing Russia
and the USSR (Majda 2005). The term Katyn symbolised communist and Russian crimes
against Poland, and became an automatic response to attempts at relativising the merits of
the PRL or acknowledging the Red Army’s war effort.
PiS is frequently categorised as a ‘populist’ party (Rupnik 2007; Vachudova 2008;
Bachmann 2006), so it is unsurprising that the party is associated with discourse antagonistic
to Russia. Hypothesis 1B posits that such rhetoric is most attractive to opposition figures.
The analysis of the discursive change in Rzeczpospolita and PiS rhetoric, along with the
increasingly monotonous characterisation of Russia, allows closer analysis of patterns of
critical coverage. One feature of the ‘othering’ discourse used is a binary contrast where
Poland is associated with truth and Russia with lies. To capture this all articles containing
‘Katyn’ and ‘Russia’ were filtered by the keyword ‘lies’. In Rzeczpospolita’s archives,
there were 97 articles from the period 2000–2010 mentioning all three terms, while GW
contained only nine articles. I filtered these results further to include articles only critical of
Russia. This left 50 articles which represent a general trend; similar wordings will have been
excluded by the search criteria. The sample size is relatively small so a cumulative average
was used to capture the level of discourse and specifically the number of articles published
in the previous six months in any given month (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 shows that the periods when this particular discourse was activated fell outside
PiS’s term in government. The discourse was mobilised during the 2005 and 2010 elections,
as well as during the period of cohabitation. Regressions for these data suggest that these
findings are statistically highly significant (see Table 5).
In Table 5 some findings are immediately striking: the election variables are statistically
significant and show that this type of discourse increases sharply in the run-up to an election
and disappears equally sharply following it. The coefficients for the ‘government’ variables
FIGURE 5. DISCURSIVE CHANGE IN RZECZPOSPOLITA RHETORIC (JANUARY 2000–MARCH
2010).
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show that this discourse increased most sharply after PiS left government (a cohabitation
coefficient of 4.45). The discourse was also in evidence during left-wing governments,
showing that it was specifically mobilised as part of an opposition strategy. The finding that
antagonistic discourse fulfilling the function of othering is activated to coincide with
elections is evidence in favour of hypothesis 1A, while the fact that such discourse was most
attractive to PiS when in opposition supports hypothesis 1B.
Hypothesis 1A suggested that Katyn might have been invoked as a legitimisation
strategy. Survey data show that one effect of PiS’s historical policies has been a polarisation
of the Polish electorate: in early 2005, before PiS entered government, the opinion polling
institute CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej) found Poles’ assessment of Polish–
Russian relations to be unrelated to political affiliation (Strzeszewski 2005, p. 6). By 2009
PO voters were significantly more optimistic regarding Polish–Russian relations than were
PiS voters, and in 2010 three times as many PiS voters believed good relations between the
countries were impossible (Feliksiak 2010). Voters’ assessment of current relations also
varied according to party lines, with PO voters more likely to categorise bilateral relations as
good. It is clear that PiS’s marketing of itself as an anti-communist party along with a hostile
relationship to Russia allowed the party to emerge with a cohesive ideology. The above
findings support the hypothesis that PiS employed Katyn as a mobilising strategy. The party
appears also to have used Katyn to give credence to the idea of an anti-communist
IV Republic. Evidence suggesting that the aggressive discourse used is associated
predominantly with one party and is distributed predominantly outside their term in
government suggests that invoking contested memory is a strategy more advantageous when
in opposition, as claimed in hypothesis 1B.
TABLE 5
DISCURSIVE CHANGE IN RZECZPOSPOLITA RHETORIC (JANUARY 2000–MARCH 2010): ARTICLES
CRITICAL OF RUSSIA
Cumulative
Cohabitation 4.45***
Left-wing government 1.58*
PiS government 0.36
Poland in EU 0.83
Russian–Polish crisis 0.84
Run-up to state visit 20.03
State visit & no crisis 0.13
State visit & crisis 4.81***
Tension & no state visit 2.35*
Russia in Gazeta Wyborcza 20.04***
April commemorations 20.20
5-year commemorations 0.78
WWII commemorations 0.28
Campaign 2.06**
Change of government 1.11
Election aftermath 21.66*
Wajda’s Katyn 20.93
Wajda’s Katyn (lag) 20.34
Constant 3.25**
Adjusted R squared 0.531
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
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Conclusions
The study of how Katyn features in Polish discourse set out to test two hypotheses, one
suggesting Katyn’s role in discourse should be relatively stable, the other suggesting
contested memories were mobilised for domestic gains, especially by opposition parties.
The evidence presented in this article supports the alternative hypotheses; Katyn has been
debated at periods coinciding with foreign-political events, but the debate has revolved
around the role Katyn should occupy in national identity. A finding of this study is that
memory conflicts are the most visible when between state-level actors, but that their cause
may lie in domestic political struggles. International memory conflicts may therefore be
analysed profitably in connection with internally disputed identities which as Vermeersch
has argued, are a consequence of a fluid party landscape where populism is a strategy
employed to clarify lines of division between post-communist parties (Vermeersch 2010).
This study suggests that the literature examining state-level memory disputes should
consider the degree to which international memory conflicts are fuelled by domestic identity
conflicts. The current high-level memory squabbles observed across Eastern Europe may be
a transient phenomenon if they emerged as part of post-communist elites seeking
ideological differentiation in a ‘flat’ party landscape.
Joanna Gorska, in her work on Polish–Russian relations, found realism to characterise
Polish–Russian relations, while Katyn figured as a ‘soft-case’ for the importance of ideas in
foreign policy (Gorska 2007, 2010). The findings presented in this study partly endorse
Gorska’s contention: PiS certainly invoked the memory of Katyn, but their objectives were
not foreign political ones. PiS were significantly less likely to draw implications hostile to
Russia from Katyn during their time in office, and more likely to do so in the run-up to
elections. This study revealed that government actors are rarely the ones pushing the question
of Katyn; instead ruling elites acted in response to more radical positions adopted by the
domestic opposition. Constructivism, then, is in this case better suited to analysing the
domestic political situation than Polish–Russian relations. These results, coupled with
opinion poll data showing that invokingKatyn is popular, indicate that contested narratives do
serve amobilising function. This is not the only function, as the invocation ofKatyn during the
period of cohabitation shows—here PiS used the foreign political sphere in order to subvert
the government’s more accommodating policy and to emerge as the upholders of the national
interest. The evidence regarding the timing of antagonistic discourse is telling: if Katyn’s
position in foreign policy was stable then it should have been on the agenda regardless of the
security and energy concerns that often underlie Polish–Russian crises. However, Katyn is
much more likely to be hotly debated at times of difficult relations with Russia than during
good ones, suggesting that elites calculate that if relations are bad, hostile rhetoric will not
have external costs but may come with domestic gains.
University of Cambridge
References
Adamska, J. (2005) ‘Mie˛dzy dwoma wrogami’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 April, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/
artykul/541509-MIEDZY-DWOMA-WROGAMI.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Aggestam, L. (1999) Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy, ARENA Working
Papers, 99/8 (Bury St Edmunds, Arena), available at: http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/
seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm, accessed 13 February 2011.
ROLF FREDHEIM1184
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
09
:21
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London,
Verso).
Assmann, J. & Czaplicka, J. (1995) ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, New German Critique, 65,
pp. 125–33.
Bachmann, K. (2006) ‘Die List der Vernunft: Populismus und Modernisierung in Polen’, Osteuropa, 56,
pp. 11–12.
Barth, F. (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston, MA, Little, Brown).
Bartoszewski, W. & Su¨ssmuth, H. (2008) Polen 2008: Kurswechsel mit Donald Tusk (Du¨sseldorf, DUP
Du¨sseldorf University Press).
Bru¨ggemann, K. & Kasekamp, A. (2008) ‘The Politics of History and the “War of Monuments” in Estonia’,
Nationalities Papers, 36, 3, pp. 425–48.
Burch, S. & Smith, D. (2007) ‘Empty Spaces and the Value of Symbols: Estonia’s “War of Monuments” from
Another Angle’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59, 6, pp. 913–36.
Connerton, P. (1989) How Societies Remember (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Cruz, C. (2000) ‘Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures’,
World Politics, 52, 3, pp. 275–312.
De Bruyn, D. (2010) ‘World War 2.0: Commemorating War and Holocaust in Poland through Facebook’,
Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media, 4, pp. 45–62.
Domagalski, M. (2009) ‘Katyn´ nie zasługuje na publicystyczne spekulacje’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 September,
available at: http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/362044-Katyn-nie-zasluguje-na-publicystyczne-spekulacje-.html,
accessed 18 March 2011.
Etkind, A. (2010) ‘The Hera Project Memory at War’, available at: http://www.hnet.org/announce/show.cgi?
ID¼174107, accessed 31 March 2011.
Etkind, A., Finnin, R., Blacker, U., Fedor, J., Lewis, S., Ma¨lksoo, M. &Mroz, M. (2012) Remembering Katyn
(Cambridge, Polity).
Feliksiak, M. (2010) ‘Opinie o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich’, Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej report
BS/74/2010, available at: www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_074_10.PDF, accessed 8 March 2011.
Fischer,B.B. (2000) ‘TheKatynControversy: Stalin’sKillingField’, Studies in Intelligence,Winter 1999–2000.
Fitzgibbon, L. (1972) The Katyn Cover-Up (London, Tom Stacey).
Gellner, E. (2008) Nations and Nationalism (New York, NY, Cornell University Press).
Gerhardt, S. (2007) Polska polityka wschodnia: die Aussenpolitik der polnischen Regierung von 1989 bis
2004 gegenu¨ber den o¨stlichen Nachbarstaaten Polens (Russland, Litauen, Weissrussland, Ukraine)
(Marburg, Herder Institut).
Gil, A. & Kapus´niak, T. (2009) Polityka wschodnia Polski: uwarunkowania, koncepcje, realizacja (Lublin,
Instytut Europy S´rodkowo-Wschodniej).
Gmyz, C. (2010) ‘10 lat IPN na straz˙y pamie˛ci’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 October, available at: http://www.rp.pl/
artykul/55271,546505_10-lat-IPN–na-strazy-pamieci.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Gmyz, C. & Stro´z˙yk, J. (2009) ‘Polacy: twardo o Katyniu’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 September, available at: http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/99645,363363_Polacy__twardo_o_Katyniu_.html, accessed 14 September 2009.
Gorska, J. A. (2007) Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analysing Poland’s Policy Towards Russia, 1989–2004,
PhD thesis, University of Oxford.
Gorska, J. A. (2010) Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analysing Poland’s Policy Towards Russia, 1989–2009
(Lanham, MD, Lexington Books).
Habermas, J. & Derrida, J. (2003) ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’, Constellations, 10, 3, pp. 291–7.
Hirst, W. & Manier, D. (2008) ‘Towards a Psychology of Collective Memory’,Memory, 16, 3, pp. 183–200.
Hobsbawm, E. J. & Ranger, T. O. (1983) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press).
Jepperson, R., Wendt, A. & Katzenstein, P. (1996) Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security (New
York, NY, Columbia University Press).
Kaczyn´ski, A. (2005a) ‘Zbrodnia, kłamstwo, milczenie, prawda’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 April, available at: http://
www.rzeczpospolita.pl/dodatki/dodatek1_050416/dodatek1_a_4.html, accessed 3 March 2011.
Kaczyn´ski, A. (2005b) ‘Tylko prawda’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 April, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/
541885.html, accessed 3 March 2011.
Kaczyn´ski, J. (2006) ‘Tekst wyste˛pienia Jarosława Kaczyn´skiego w debacie o 100 dniach rze˛du Kazimierza
Marcinkiewicza’, Gazeta.pl, 17 February, available at: http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wybory2005/
1,67805,3169952.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Kaczyn´ski, L. (2009) ‘Kaczyn´ski: Prawda jest jedna, choc´ cze˛sto bywa bolesna’, Rzeczpospolita, 1
September, available at: http://www.rp.pl/artykul/357111.html, accessed 29 September 2011.
THE MEMORY OF KATYN IN POLISH POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1185
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
09
:21
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Kangaspuro,M. (2010) ‘ConstructingRussian Identity in theMedia:Between theHistoryofWWII and the Future
of Europeanness’, available at: http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/projects/constructing.htm,
accessed 31 March 2011.
Kisielewski, T. A. (2008) Katyn: zbrodnia i kłamstwo (Poznan´, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS).
Kołakowska, D. (2009) ‘Kiedy w Sejmie o ataku ZSRR’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 September, available at: http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/363049.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Kosicki, P. H. (2011) ‘Polish Memory of Katyn, 1943–2010’, Memory at War Inaugural Workshop, King’s
College, Cambridge, 4–5 June, abstract available at: http://www.memoryatwar.org/publications-list/
piotr-kosicki-abstract.pdf, accessed 3 May 2014.
Kubiak, P. & Wybranowski, W. (2009) ‘Co powiedze˛ prezydent i premier’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 September,
available at: http://www.rp.pl/artykul/356744.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Kurczab-Redlich, K. (2005) ‘Doke˛d prowadzi nas Putin’,Rzeczpospolita, 14May, available at: http://archiwum.
rp.pl/artykul/546700.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Kuz´niar, R. (2001) Poland’s Security Policy 1989–2000 (Warsaw, Scholar).
Kuz´niar, R. (2009) Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw, Scholar).
Lacan, J. (1977) E´crits: A Selection (London, Tavistock/Routledge).
Larsen, H. (1997) Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London, Psychology
Press).
Łe˛towski, M. (2005) ‘Moskwa nie wierzy łzom’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 April, available at: http://archiwum.rp.
pl/artykul/544247-Moskwa-nie-wierzy-lzom.html, accessed 3 March 2011.
Lisicki, P. (2009) ‘Ile zrozumiał Władimir Putin’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 September, available at: http://www.rp.
pl/artykul/357145.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Lisicki, P. (2011) ‘O Rzeczpospolitej’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 January, available at: http://www.rp.pl/temat/
194245.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Madera, A. J. (2003) Polska polityka zagraniczna: Europa S´rodkowo-Wschodnia 1989–2003 (Krako´w,
Firma ‘Sas’ Wanda Tarnawska).
Maj, E. & Wo´jcik, A. (2008) Mys´l polityczna w Polsce po 1989 roku: wybrane nurty ideowe (Lublin,
Wydawn, Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sko´dowskiej).
Majda, A. (2005) ‘Rosyjska riposta na spot’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 May, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/
artykul/546582.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Manys, K. (2009) ‘Sejm przemilczy napas´c´ Sowieto´w—przez kło´tnie˛’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 September,
available at: http://www.rp.pl/artykul/362147.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Markowski, R. (2006) ‘The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of the Party System?’,
West European Politics, 29, 4, pp. 814–32.
Marzec, B. (2005) ‘Lata walki o prawde˛’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 April, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/
artykul/541524-Lata-walki-o-prawde.html, accessed 27 February 2011.
Maull, H., Stahl, B., Boeckle, H., Jo¨hannisdottir, A. & Nadoll, J. (2002) ‘Abschlussbericht des DFG-
gefo¨rderten Projekts: “europa¨ische Außenpolitik im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem”’, available at:
http://www.bernhard-stahl.de/docs/pafe_bericht.pdf, accessed 17 March 2011.
McHoul, A. W. (1993) A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power, and the Subject (New York, NY, NYU Press).
Montfort, H. D. (1966) Le massacre de Katyn, crime russe ou crime alleman? (Paris, La Table Ronde).
Neumann, I. B. (2002) ‘Europe’s Post-Cold War Memory of Russia: cui bono?’, in Mu¨ller, J. W. (ed.)
Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
Nikiporets-Takigawa, G. (2013) ‘War of Memories in the Ukrainian Media: Diversity of Identities, Political
Confrontation, and Production Technologies’, in Rutten, E., Zvereva, V. & Fedor, J. (eds) Memory,
Conflict and Social Media: Web Wars in Post-Soviet States (London, Routledge).
Olick, J. K. (2008) ‘“Collective Memory”: A Memoir and Prospect’, Memory Studies, 1, 1.
Olick, J. K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. & Levy, D. (eds) (2011) The Collective Memory Reader (New York, NY,
Oxford University Press).
Ordyn´ski, J. (2005) ‘Dali s´wiadectwo prawdzie’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 April, available at: http://archiwum.rp.
pl/artykul/541628-Dali-swiadectwo-prawdzie.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
PAFE (2003) ‘Outline of the PAFE Project’, available at: http://www.bernhard-stahl.de/docs/pafe_idea_en.pdf,
accessed 17 September 2010.
Pankowski, K. (2010) ‘Polacy o uroczystos´ciach w Katyniu i udziale w nich premiera Rosji’, Centrum
Badania Opinii Społecznej report BS/46/2010, available at: www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_046_
10.PDF, accessed 8 March 2011.
Paul, A. (2010) Katyn: Stalin’s Massacre and the Triumph of Truth (DeKalb, IL, Northern Illinois University
Press).
PiS (2003) ‘Konstytucja IV Rzeczypospolitej’, 19 March, available at: http://www.pis.org.pl/doc.php?
d¼unit&id¼7, accessed 28 February 2011.
ROLF FREDHEIM1186
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
09
:21
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Piwowar, M. (2009) ‘Stalin chciał pomo´c Hitlerowi’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 August, available at: http://www.rp.
pl/artykul/351644.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Prus, J. (2009) ‘Moskwa wysyła sprzeczne sygnały’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 September, available at: http://www.
rp.pl/artykul/356733.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Przewoz´nik, A. & Adamska, J. (2010) Katyn. Zbrodnia, prawda, pamie˛c´ (Warszawa, S´wiat Ksie˛z˙ki).
Radziwinowicz, W. (2009) ‘Rosja, kto´ra nie kłamie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 August, available at: http://
wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6961011,Rosja__ktora_nie_klamie.html, accessed 27 September 2010.
Rupnik, J. (2007) ‘From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash’, Journal of Democracy, 18, 4, pp. 17–25.
Said, E. (1978) Orientalism (London, Routledge).
Sandecki, M. (2009) ‘Prezydent na Westerplatte: Katyn jak holocaust’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 September,
available at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6987235,Prezydent_na_Westerplatte__Katyn_jak_holokaust.
html, accessed 2 July 2010.
Sanford, G. (2005) Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice, and Memory (London, Routledge).
Smith, S. (2001) ‘Foreign Policy is what States Make of it: Social Construction and International Relations
Theory’, in Kuba´lkova´, V. (ed.) Foreign Policy in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe),
pp. 38–55.
S´piewak, P. (2003) ‘Koniec złudzen´’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 January, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/
419180.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Stahl, Z. & Anders, W. (1965) The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents (London, Polish Cultural
Foundation).
Stahl, Z., Anders, W. & Sendy, J. (1949) Katyn (Paris, Polish Cultural Foundation).
Stro´z˙yk, J. (2008) ‘Zgine˛ły dokumenty w sprawie Katynia?’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 July, available at: http://
archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/791694.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Stryker, S., Owens, T. J. & White, R. W. (2000) Self, Identity, and Social Movements (Minneapolis, MN,
University of Minnesota Press).
Strzelczyk, J. (2002) Ucieczka ze Wschodu: Rosja w polskiej polityce, 1989–1993 (Warszawa, Rytm).
Strzeszewski, M. (2005) ‘Opinie o udziale Prezydenta RP w uroczystos´ciach 9 maja w Moskwie i stosunkach
polsko-rosyjskich’, Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej report BS/76/2005, available at: www.cbos.pl/
SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_076_05.PDF, accessed 8 March 2011.
Strzeszewski, M. (2008) ‘Opinie o polityce zagranicznej rze˛du i Prezydenta’, Centrum Badania Opinii
Społecznej report BS/151/2008, available at: www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_151_08.PDF,
accessed 8 March 2011.
Szacka, B. (2006) Czas przeszły—pamie˛c´—mit (Warszawa, Scholar).
Terlikowski, T. P. (2009) ‘Negacjonizm po polsku’, Rzeczpospolita, 15 September, available at: http://www.
rp.pl/artykul/363470.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Trznadel, J. (1994) Powro´t rozstrzelanej armii: Katyn: fakty, rewizje, pogle˛dy (Lublin, Antyk).
Uhlig, D. (2009) ‘PiS atakuje Tuska za Putina’,Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 September, available at: http://wyborcza.
pl/1,76842,6995462,PiS_atakuje_Tuska_za_Putina.html, accessed 2 July 2010.
Vachudova, M. A. (2008) ‘Centre-Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe’, Party
Politics, 14, 4.
Vermeersch, P. (2010) ‘Contesting Europe: Strategies and Legacies in Polish Political Competition’, Europe-
Asia Studies, 62, 3, pp. 503–22.
Waever, O. (1995) ‘Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in EU Studies’,
Journal of International Affairs, 48, 2, pp. 389–431.
Wendt, A. (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, The American Political Science
Review, 88, 2, pp. 384–96.
Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Wildstein, B. (2009) ‘Partyjne rachuby ponad racje˛ stanu’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 September, available at: http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/362911.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Wilson, A. (1995) ‘The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes’,
Journal of Contemporary History, 30, 2.
Wolsza, T. (2008) ‘Katyn to juz˙ na zawsze katy i katowani’: w ‘polskim Londynie’ o sowieckiej zbrodni w
Katyniu (1944–1956) (Warszawa, Instytut Historii PAN).
Wybranowski,W. (2009) ‘Prezydentmo´wił o ludobo´jstwie’,Rzeczpospolita, 18September, available at: http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/365065.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Zdort, D. (2008) ‘Upudrowana historia’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 September, available at: http://www.rp.pl/
artykul/191692.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
Zychowicz, P. (2009) ‘List Putina to wysublimowana prowokacja’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 September, available
at: http://www.rp.pl/artykul/356732.html, accessed 29 March 2011.
THE MEMORY OF KATYN IN POLISH POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1187
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
09
:21
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
